Screen reading: Electromagnetic information leakage from the computer monitor
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Published:2022
Issue:4
Volume:70
Page:836-855
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ISSN:0042-8469
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Container-title:Vojnotehnicki glasnik
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language:en
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Short-container-title:Vojnotehnički glasnik
Author:
Grdović MilenaORCID, Protić DanijelaORCID, Antić VladimirORCID, Jovanović BorišaORCID
Abstract
Introduction/purpose: The security of systems can be jeopardized by compromising emanations. This paper provides an overview of computer screen attacks. New technologies can be used to exfiltrate sensitive data from computer screens. Emission security is the prevention of electromagnetic signal attacks that are conducted or radiated. Methods: This paper examines the impact of a side-channel attack that intercepts compromised information from a computer screen. The leakage of electromagnetic data is also explained. Software-defined radios are described to explain malicious attacks on computer monitors. Results: The source of the electromagnetic signal determines the nature of the side-channel information they carry. The most well-known issue associated with revealing emissions is the possibility of intercepting visual information displayed on computer monitors. Conclusion: Visual data displayed on computer monitors could be intercepted by a software-defined radio which can digitize the desired frequency spectrum directly from an antenna, present it to a digital signal processor, and output it to an application for revealing sensitive data. A Grdović, M. et al, Screen reading: electromagnetic information leakage from the computer monitor, pp.836-855 variety of countermeasures, such as shielding, zoning, soft TEMPEST, and similar techniques, can be used to prevent data leakage.
Publisher
Centre for Evaluation in Education and Science (CEON/CEES)
Subject
General Engineering
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