Ethics of Strategic Voting in Popular Elections

Abstract

Misreporting of preferences is a common behavior among voters but still considered as moral wrongdoing. I propose the conceptual framework of its dilemmas and argue that tactical voting may NOT be regarded as a moral wrong if implemented in a popular election. I examine the relationship between strategic voting and its moral burden in correspondence to particular moral doubts possible to found in respective literature. Thanks to voting paradoxes revealed by mathematicians and economists gathered around a movement called social choice theory I challenge 1) “the consequentialistic argument” and 2) the “express value argument” which eventually is regarded as non-conclusive whereas it presupposes not commonly accepted view on the role of election in democracy itself. In answer to 3) “sincere argument” which suggests manipulation since the agent does not express one's profound preference, so to say, does not vote naively, I distinguish sincere and insincere manipulations. Then, I challenge five of Sattherwaite's “transparency arguments”: 4) inequality of skills, 5) inefficiency, 6) non-transparency of voters' preferences, 7) non-transparency of representatives' preferences, and 8) randomness, which I treat by and large as a valid with minor comments added. However, I believe that some of the “transparency arguments” can be adopted as a virtue rather than a vice of democracy, because encourage cooperation and induce to actualize ongoing coalitions. Finally, I distinguish a weak and a strong position against treating strategic voting as moral wrongdoing. Former one argues that strategic voting may be “sincere”, therefore morally acceptable according to argument 3). However, the latter rejects the election’s claim to bear any moral burden and persuades that voting itself should be perceived as an ethics-free decision-making device.