Strategic Risks Hindering Nuclear War Between China and the United States

Author:

Strigunov Konstantin Sergeevich

Abstract

The object of the study is a hypothetical nuclear war between China and the United States. The subject of the study is the strategic risks preventing a nuclear war between China and the United States. The aim of the study is to determine the strategic risks that prevent the initiation of a nuclear war between China and the United States at the stage of making a decision to launch a first nuclear strike. Methods and methodology. The study was carried out within the framework of neorealism. A systematic approach was used as well as the methodology of classical military-political studies. Among the methods used were such general scientific methods as analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction. The method of studying documents and the factorial approach were also used. The article analyzes the strategic risks that prevent the unleashing of a nuclear war between powers with the world's largest economies in the context of intensive globalization.      The author concludes that the strategic risks of nuclear war outweigh the benefits of it especially in the context of intense globalization. The expectation of a nuclear strike and the mechanism for making a decision about it, in the author's opinion, are one of the most important factors in the low probability of actors to resort to nuclear war as a means of resolving contradictions. At the same time the misinterpretation of damage and the difference in understanding the scale of a nuclear strike also hinders a nuclear war. The novelty of this research. The issue of a hypothetical nuclear war between China and the United States is considered for the first time in scenarios of limited and massive nuclear weapons, simultaneously taking into account the factors of intensive globalization; the «fog of war» effect, which plays an extremely important role; the risk of a distorted interpretation by the attacked of the scale of nuclear strikes; different understanding by the attacker and the attacked of what is considered a limited strike and the risk of a disproportionate response; erasing the boundary between limited and massive nuclear strike in the context of intensive globalization and reducing the level of unacceptable damage; third party factors, incl. state or non-state actors capable of provoking a nuclear escalation.

Publisher

Aurora Group, s.r.o

Subject

General Medicine

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