Affiliation:
1. University of Birmingham
Abstract
In this paper we ask whether the two-factor theory of delusions is compatible with two claims, that delusions are pathological and that delusions are adaptive. We concentrate on two recent and influential models of the two-factor theory: the one proposed by Max Coltheart, Peter Menzies and John Sutton (2010) and the one developed by Ryan McKay (2012). The models converge on the nature of Factor 1 but diverge about the nature of Factor 2. The differences between the two models are reflected in different accounts of the pathological and adaptive nature of delusions. We will explore such differences, considering naturalist and normativist accounts of the pathological and focusing on judgements of adaptiveness that are informed by the shear-pin hypothesis (McKay and Dennett 2009). After reaching our conclusions about the two models, we draw more general implications for the status of delusions within two-factor theories. Are there good grounds to claim that delusions are pathological? Are delusions ever adaptive? Can delusions be at the same time pathological and adaptive?
Publisher
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences University of Rijeka
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,Philosophy
Cited by
6 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. Are delusions pathological beliefs?;Asian Journal of Philosophy;2022-07
2. Debunking Doxastic Transparency;European journal of analytic philosophy;2022-02-22
3. Reconsidering harm in psychiatric manuals within an explicationist framework;Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy;2022-01-17
4. When a Hybrid Account of Disorder is not Enough;European journal of analytic philosophy;2021-12-01
5. Expressivism about delusion attribution;European journal of analytic philosophy;2020-11-08