Affiliation:
1. Center for Institutional Studies, National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)
Abstract
Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) is responsible for controlling the level of competition in the Russian economy, in particular, in public procurement. Antitrust enforcement does not increase competition in this sphere and instead often leads to higher prices. In this article we analyze the reasons for favoritism in St. Petersburg drug procurement and main actions against restrictions of competition. We show that weak sanctions of the FAS cannot break illegal longterm relations between public procurer and affiliated bidder.
Subject
Economics and Econometrics,Finance
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