Public Choice Theory. A Textbook. Chapter 9. Economics of Bureaucracy-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Public Choice Theory. A Textbook. Chapter 9. Economics of Bureaucracy

Published:2003-04-20 Issue:4 Volume: Page:135-157
ISSN:0042-8736
Container-title:Voprosy Ekonomiki
language:
Short-container-title:Vopr. èkon.

Author:

Nureev R.¹

Affiliation:

1. State University - Higher School of Economics

Abstract

The main features of the economics of bureaucracy are considered in the ninth chapter of the textbook. The models of bureaucracy behavior created by W. Niskanen, G. Tullock, A. Breton, G. Brennan and J. Buchanan are analyzed. Special interests groups are distinguished. The mechanism of lobbying is characterized. The concepts of rent-seeking and corruption are defined. The chapter also includes further readings, control tests and questions.

Publisher

NP Voprosy Ekonomiki

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Finance

Reference69 articles.

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