International Antitrust: Demand, Restrictionsand Lessons for Customs Union

Author:

Avdasheva S.1,Shastitko A.2

Affiliation:

1. National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)

2. Lomonosov Moscow State University; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

Enforcement of antitrust rules on the international level, on the one hand, is necessary to deter restriction of competition by the largest market participants, on the other - it suffers from the contradictions between incentives of national players. That is why international competition policy is based on institutional alternatives which look very imperfect. Harmonization of competition rules seems to be a good alternative only at first glance, since transplantation of antitrust provisions in different legal systems with different standards of proofs and different enforcement practices de facto leads to modification of the rule. Effective competition policy at the level of Customs Union requires to take into account all these limitations and risks.

Publisher

NP Voprosy Ekonomiki

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Finance

Reference10 articles.

1. Avdasheva S., Kalinina M. (2012). Mergers Remedies (Comparative Analysis of Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia and European Competition Commission Practice) // Ekonomicheskaya Politika. No 1. P. 141—158.

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3. Shastitko A. E. (2008). Economics of International Relations: Conditions of Sustainability under Absence of “External” Enforcers // Economic Development in Contemporary World: Region Competitiveness in Global Economy. Basic papers of the Fifth international scientific and praсtical conference in Ekaterinburg. P. 85—90.

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5. Connor J. M. (2004). Extraterritoriality of the Sherman Act and Deterrence of Private International Cartels // American Antitrust Institute Working Paper. No 04-02. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=611948.

Cited by 2 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献 订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Restriction of Competition on “Traditional” and Multi-lateral Markets: Common Features and Peculiarities;Scientific Research of Faculty of Economics. Electronic Journal;2020-12-31

2. To Allow for Cartels?;Voprosy Ekonomiki;2015-06-20

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