Abstract
In his “An Epistemic Defense of News Abstinence” (2021), Sven Bernecker argues for a radical epistemic approach to counter the consumption of fake news. He suggests that a subject can be propositionally justified in ignoring the news under specific circumstances. This paper critically examines Bernecker’s account and raises essential concerns undermining its plausibility. Then, it proposes a revision of the news abstinence account. It is argued that the original attitude of ignoring the news is epistemically inappropriate and should be replaced with a more suitable attitude of suspending judgment. This adjustment allows for the maintenance of Bernecker’s original idea of an epistemic defense strategy against the consumption of fake news while avoiding its associated issues.
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