Affiliation:
1. The author is in the Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912–1918, USA.
Abstract
This Viewpoint formulates and responds to three lines of argument concerning human reproductive cloning's potential to undermine our sense of self or identity. First, cloning would undermine our sense of individuality or uniqueness. But it could only undermine our genetic uniqueness, not our full individuality. Second, cloning would undermine the value or worth of human beings. But it would not make individuals replaceable or of any less moral worth. Third, a clone's freedom or autonomy to construct his or her own life would be undermined by the presence of an earlier twin. But only a mistaken belief in genetic determinism supports this feared loss of freedom.
Publisher
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
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