Strengthen oversight of risky research on pathogens-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Strengthen oversight of risky research on pathogens

Published:2022-12-16 Issue:6625 Volume:378 Page:1170-1172
ISSN:0036-8075
Container-title:Science
language:en
Short-container-title:Science

Author:

Pannu Jaspreet¹²,Palmer Megan J.³⁴,Cicero Anita¹,Relman David A.²⁴⁵⁶,Lipsitch Marc⁷,Inglesby Tom¹

Affiliation:

1. Center for Health Security, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD, USA.

2. Department of Medicine, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA, USA.

3. Department of Bioengineering, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA.

4. Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA.

5. Department of Microbiology and Immunology, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA, USA.

6. Infectious Diseases Section, Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System, Palo Alto, CA, USA.

7. Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics, Departments of Epidemiology and Immunology and Infectious Diseases, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, MA, USA.

Abstract

Policy reset and convergence on governance are needed

Publisher

American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)

Subject

Multidisciplinary

Reference12 articles.

1. World Health Organization, Global Guidance Framework for the Responsible Use of the Life Sciences: Mitigating Biorisks and Governing Dual-Use Research (World Health Organization, 2022).

2. Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists The Interacademy Partnership (2021); https://www.interacademies.org/publication/tianjin-biosecurity-guidelines-codes-conduct-scientists.

3. M. J. Palmer, F. Fukuyama, D. A. Relman, Science 350, 1471 (2015).

4. United States Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern Department of Health and Human Services (2012); https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/us-policy-durc-032812.pdf.

5. Framework for Guiding Funding Decisions about Proposed Research Involving Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogens (P3CO) Department of Health and Human Services (2017); https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Pages/ResearchReview-PPP.aspx.

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