Experience of regret is unaffected by concurrent working memory load

Abstract

Background When facing the consequences of decisions, people often experience evaluative emotions such as regret. The experience of regret is the result of the comparison between the actual outcome of one’s actions and a better counterfactual outcome that could have occurred had one acted differently in the past. Despite increasing interest in counterfactual thinking and regret, little is known about the type of cognitive processes involved with regret –whether it is underpinned by reflective or intuitive processes. The extant literature provides contradictory evidence: theoretical assertions and developmental work point towards reflective processes, requiring access to capacity-limited cognitive resources whereas, some experimental and neuroscientific evidence point towards intuitive processes. Methods In the current study, adults (N = 20) completed a commonly used gambling task known to elicit regret under high or low working memory load. Results Ratings of regret were not affected by concurrent working memory load (Bayes Factors provided strong evidence for the null hypothesis). Conclusions We conclude that the experience of regret in a commonly used gambling task is unaffected by concurrent working memory load. This suggests that, in adults, regret is not always reliant on reflective cognitive processes and does not require access to central cognitive resources.