Pleasing the voters in Albania: Allowable speed limits and parking spaces increase just before elections

Abstract

Abstract In Albania, just before elections, traffic and parking fines decrease in number and magnitude, as the government turns a blind eye to infractions in order to curry favour with voters and thus retain power. Once the elections are over, a period of stricter enforcement of traffic and parking rules typically ensues, and revenues from fines surge. We term this - so far unnamed – phenomenon “Electoral Mobility Management”. To provide evidence of EMM, we examine the fluctuations in revenues from traffic and parking fines issued by the state and municipal police in conjunction with national elections held between 2012 and 2021. We employ existing data collected by various institutions in Albania, which we model based on a robust econometric tool called intervention analysis. We find intermittent political interference in traffic police operations, both at the state and municipal levels. EMM is detrimental to road safety, traffic police legitimacy, and parking efficiency.