How to control municipal solid waste incineration pollution? Exploration of the third-party supervision.

Abstract

Abstract Municipal solid waste (MSW) is gradually rising along with residents' living conditions, which boosts the demand of the waste incineration. However, environment and public health are seriously threatened by incineration pollution. In this study, we present a model of third-party enterprise supervision and build a differential game model among the government, third-party supervision enterprise, and waste incinerator. We investigate how to encourage third-party enterprises to increase their supervision and avoid the collision. The results show that: (1) In the long run, the third-party supervision mode is more conducive to reducing incineration pollution. (2) The governments must set a higher penalty for third-party enterprises to avoid the collision. Meanwhile, compared with the supervision approach, we suggest governments in large cities implement penalty mechanisms to prevent collusion. (3) As the amount of MSW increases, compared with the supervision of third-party enterprises on incinerators, the government's punishment policy is more effective in promoting incineration plants to increase pollution control input. The paper offers policy recommendations to the government that can assist to lessen waste incineration pollution and improve MSW management efficiency.