A stochastic evolutionary game model of green credit participation behavior among banks and enterprises

Abstract

Abstract With the growing severity of environmental problems, green credit has become an important means of promoting low-carbon development, however, the motivation of banks and enterprises to participate in green credit is insufficient. In order to effectively guide banks and enterprises to actively participate in green credit, we constructed a stochastic evolutionary game model for banks and enterprises to participate in green credit, and analyzed the dynamic game relationship between banks and enterprises. Due to the uncertainty of the external environment, we introduce Gaussian white noise in the replicated dynamic equations, and finally, we use numerical simulation to describe the dynamic evolution trend of the two-dimensional game system. The results show that the stochastic disturbances from external uncertainties amplify the fluctuation range of the game between banks and enterprises and shortening the time to achieve a stable strategy. As enterprises’ fulfillment levels improve, the strategic choices of both banks and enterprises gradually converge to (implement, participate), with banks converging more swiftly. When the government provides certain subsidies, both banks and enterprises tend to opt for green credit, however, after subsidies reach a certain threshold, increasing them no longer significantly impacts strategic choices. An escalation in carbon trading prices also spurs enterprises to choose green credit.