Affiliation:
1. Brandenburg
University of Technology (BTU) Cottbus-Senftenberg
Abstract
Abstract
Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mathematical model: Elections as problem of choice or ranking. We show how the model can be enhanced to take into account the complete process starting from the whole set of persons having passive electoral rights and even the aspect of reelection. By a new view on abstentions from voting and an adaption of Majority Judgement with three grades, we are able to describe a complete process for an election that can be easily put into legislation and sets suitable incentives for politicians who want to be reelected.
JEL Classification: D72 , D71
MSC Classification: 91-10 , 91B12 , 91B14
Publisher
Research Square Platform LLC
Reference28 articles.
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4. Balinski, Michel and Laraki, Rida (2022) Majority judgment vs. approval voting. Operations Research 70(3): 1296--1316 INFORMS
5. Balinski, Michel and Laraki, Rida (2014) Judge: Don't Vote!. Operations Research 62(3): 483--511 INFORMS