Abstract
The increasing number of scrapped cars and the low recycling rate have caused global environmental pollution, resource waste, and safety hazards. This article is based on the extended producer responsibility system and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, automobile production enterprises, and recycling enterprises from the perspectives of product lifecycle and reverse logistics. It explores the impact of government subsidies, social reputation, and coordination costs on the cooperation process between automobile production enterprises and recycling enterprises, and conducts numerical simulation analysis to verify the effectiveness of the model. Research conclusion: (1) Increasing the cost savings and new car sales revenue of automobile production enterprises purchasing remanufacturing materials from recycling enterprises will increase their willingness to cooperate, but it will reduce the willingness of recycling enterprises to cooperate. (2) Increasing coordination costs will suppress the cooperation enthusiasm between automobile production enterprises and recycling enterprises, especially recycling enterprises. (3) The increase in government management costs and subsidies is not conducive to government subsidy preferences. (4) The increase in social reputation benefits will be conducive to increasing the enthusiasm of government subsidies and promoting the willingness of automobile production enterprises and recycling enterprises to cooperate.