Drug Quality Supervision Strategy Analysis under Government Rewards and Punishments: What Role does Patient Feedback Play？

Abstract

Abstract In recent years, the frequent occurrence of drug quality and safety incidents, which seriously affect economic development, social stability and public’s health, has always been one of the hot issues that are widely concerned by all over the world. Therefore, this paper constructs a differential game model of drug quality supervision, analyses the influence of government and patients’ interaction mediated by co-regulation information platform on drug quality investment decision-making of pharmaceutical enterprises and retailers, and discusses the decision-making outcomes of pharmaceutical enterprises and retailers under government rewards and punishments. Backward Induction Method is used to solve the model, and Matlab 2021b is used for simulation analysis. The results show that, firstly, when patients give positive feedback, the reward strength of government and the quality perceived utility of patients jointly determine the external positive utility of pharmaceutical enterprises and retailers. Secondly, when patients give negative feedback, the supervision effect of punishment is affected by the market demand for the drug. Furthermore, government rewards and punishments will affect the drug’s wholesale and retail price. The decision-making of pharmaceutical enterprises is affected by the government rewards and punishments for retailers; at the same time, the retailers’ decision-making is also affected by the government rewards and punishments for pharmaceutical enterprises. Finally, this paper enriches and expands the theoretical basis of drug quality supervision, and put forwards countermeasures and suggestions for how to optimize the decision-making of the main subjects of the pharmaceutical supply chain.