Affiliation:
1. Graduate School of Sociology, Kwansei Gakuin University/Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
2. School of Sociology, Kwansei Gakuin University
Abstract
Abstract
An increasing body of research suggests that punishment systems in social dilemma situations may discourage cooperation by reducing trust and social incentives. If this is the case, one would expect a substantial decrease in cooperation when the punishment system is introduced and then removed. In this study, we defined the detrimental effect of punishment (DEP) as a reduction in cooperation after the removal of punishment in comparison to cooperation in a control group. We investigated the occurrence of DEP by manipulating the magnitude (strong, weak) and type (normative, competitive) of punishment. Through two pre-registered studies, we found no significant DEPs for any combination of punishment magnitude and type. By adopting the approach of ascertaining the robustness of the phenomenon under investigation before delving into its mechanism, it may be possible to address the reproducibility issue.
Publisher
Research Square Platform LLC
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