Impact of voluntary testing on infectious disease epidemiology: A game theoretic approach

Abstract

Abstract The World Health Organization recommends test-and-treat interventions to curb and even eliminate epidemics of HIV, viral hepatitis, and sexually transmitted infections (e.g., chlamydia, gonorrhea, syphilis and trichomoniasis). Epidemic models show these goals are achievable, provided the participation of individuals in test-and-treat interventions is sufficiently high. We combine epidemic models and game theoretic models to describe individual’s decisions to get tested for infectious diseases within certain epidemiological contexts, and, implicitly, their voluntary participation to test-and-treat interventions. We develop three hybrid models, to discuss interventions against HIV, HCV, and sexually transmitted infections, and the potential behavioral response from the target population. Our findings are similar across diseases. Particularly, individuals use three distinct behavioral patterns relative to testing, based on their perceived costs for testing, besides the payoff for discovering their disease status. Firstly, if the cost of testing is too high, then individuals refrain from voluntary testing and get tested only if they are symptomatic. Secondly, if the cost is moderate, some individuals will test voluntarily, starting treatment if needed. Hence, the spread of the disease declines and the disease epidemiology is mitigated. Thirdly, the most beneficial testing behavior takes place as individuals perceive a per-test payoff that surpasses a certain threshold, every time they get tested. Consequently, individuals achieve high voluntary testing rates, which may result in the elimination of the epidemic, albeit on temporary basis. Trials and studies have attained different levels of participation and testing rates. To increase testing rates, they should provide each eligible individual with a payoff, above a given threshold, each time the individual tests voluntarily.