Affiliation:
1. China People's Public Security University
Abstract
Abstract
Based on the system dynamics theory, this paper establishes an environmental mass event evolution model and explores the evolution law of mass events caused by environmental problems. From a methodological point of view, the mixed-strategy evolutionary game principle and dynamic punishment measures are combined, and simulation analysis is carried out by Anylogic software, and the results show that there is no stable evolutionary equilibrium solution for the two sides of the game in the traditional asymmetric mixed-strategy game model, and after adjusting the game payoff matrix and incorporating the dynamic punishment strategy, stable evolutionary equilibrium solutions appear in the evolutionary game model, and the system begins to tend to be stabilized. The process and conclusions of the simulation experiment provide methodological reference and theoretical support for the analysis of the evolution of environmental mass events.
Publisher
Research Square Platform LLC
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