Secretive cultures and non-performing loans of microfinance institutions

Abstract

Abstract Microfinance institutions (MFIs) have contributed significantly in improving the lives of underprivileged sections of society. Significant amount of prior literature has, therefore, tried to identify factors that can have positive impact on their performance. However, there is scarcity of research that document the impact of cultural factors on the performance of MFIs. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by documenting the impact of secretive cultures on non-performing loans of MFIs headquartered in 65 countries during the period between 2007 and 2018. This paper uses various estimation procedures, such as pooled OLS regression, instrument variable regression, Fama-MacBeth regression, and panel regression with random effect. The findings of this paper suggest that MFIs headquartered in countries that score high on secrecy have more non-performing loans than MFIs headquartered in countries that score low on secrecy. These findings are robust across various sensitivity checks, such as different sample structures, different proxies of main variables, and different estimation procedures. We argue that secretive cultures are not conducive for information disclosure. In the absence of required information, capital providers are exposed to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Therefore, it becomes difficult for them to differentiate creditworthy borrowers from financially weak borrowers. As a result, they are more likely to make erroneous decisions, which may lead to higher default on the loans.