Hylomorphic interpretation of Descartes’s notion of the union of mind and body

Abstract

All interpreters agree that Descartes thought that there are at least two substances (excluding God): mind, whose primary attribute is thought and body, whose primary attribute is extension. However, Paul Hoffman argues that Descartes thought that there is in fact a third substance - a human being, namely a substantial union of mind and body. Hoffman refers to many passages in which Descartes describes the soul as the substantial form and its substantial unity with the body. In this paper, I will try to point out the weaknesses of this interpretation. Also, my aim is to show that the phenomenological interpretation by Alison Simmons provides a much more convincing explanation of the same passages that Hoffman refers to. Finally, I will show that, despite many of its flaws, Hoffman?s interpretation still represents a significant improvement in illuminating Descartes?s complex understanding of the mind-body relation, relative to the well-known Gilbert Ryle?s interpretation of Descartes.