Affiliation:
1. Odsek za filozofiju, Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Novom Sadu
Abstract
Phenomenological egology presents a fruitful area for examining the concept
of the I (ego) and its relation with consciousness. It is possible to
distinguish as many as four stages in the development of Husserl?s
egological views. Logical Investigations [1900/1] represents a prominently
nonegological, Humean position, which is reflected in the denial of the pure
I in the phenomenological stream of consciousness, and which is formulated
in relation to the neo-Kantians. The unity of consciousness is based on the
phenomenological I understood as the ?core? of the empirical I, for which
the latter appears as the phenomenal I. The shortcomings of such an
attitude, some of which Husserl himself will point out, will motivate the
transition to the egological position in Ideas [1913], which will mark the
entire further development of his phenomenology. The explication of these
shortcomings is of wider significance for the discussion between egological
and nonegological theories of consciousness.
Publisher
National Library of Serbia
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