Affiliation:
1. Institut za filozofiju, Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu
Abstract
Kripke-Armstrong argument aims to establish that the defender of existence of
material objects? temporal parts cannot determine whether a lonely
homogeneous disc made of continuous matter is rotating around its axis or
not. The perdurantist cannot distinguish between these two possibilities by
appealing to different instantaneous velocities of instantaneous temporal
parts of the disc, since by doing so he would violate the Humean
supervenience thesis. In this paper I will show, following Jeremy
Butterfield, how Kripke-Armstrong challenge can be answered while retaining
Humean supervenience: by appealing to different instantaneous velocities of
non-instantaneous temporal parts of the Kripke-Armstrong lonely disc.
Funder
Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia
Publisher
National Library of Serbia
Reference29 articles.
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5. Butterfield, Jeremy (2005). „On the Persistence of Homogeneous Matter”, http://philsci-archive. pitt.edu/2381/1/DiscsJul051.pdf (10. jul 2020).