A brief introduction to virtue epistemology

Abstract

This paper presents a concise and stimulating introduction to virtue epistemology, a field of epistemology that has gained increasing importance in recent decades. At the beginning of the paper, we explain the methodological turn towards the epistemic agent as the subject of research, which is the beginning and the defining characteristic of this approach to epistemology. We introduce two main approaches to the understanding of epistemic virtues: reliabilism and responsibilism. The first approach considers epistemic virtues as stable traits that reliably lead to the truth, while the second understands them as desirable and praiseworthy dispositions of our character. After demonstrating that these two approaches are best viewed as complementary, we move on to consider the main themes of virtue epistemology. As the most relevant topics, we singled out: the question of the nature of epistemic virtues; the relationship between moral and epistemic virtues; exploring the importance of individual virtues; shifting focus on epistemological vices and expanding the framework of virtue epistemology to groups and extended cognition. Finally, we address the practical potentials of virtue epistemology in the fields of education and human resources.