Habermas’s Emancipation as Lifeworldization

Abstract

The most consequential distinction Habermas draws between Marx’s and his own utopia of emancipation is that societal differentiation, in the former, is dissolved into the lifeworld, whereas in the latter it is preserved as an accomplishment of and necessary for the reproduction of modern complex societies. Despite Habermas’s intention and arguments, his radical democratic utopia entails lifeworldization—in which the primacy of communicative reason is affirmed in all spheres of action as well as societal integration, which, however, can take a variety of modi operandi ranging from external influence to direct communicative coordination. This article makes a case for the lifeworldization thesis with the following arguments. First, contrary to Habermas’s intention, “influence” and “countersteering,” if successfully asserted, result in an ontological condition that amounts to lifeworldization. Second, Habermas’s defense of differentiation and critique of dedifferentiation, which is predicated on his critique of society as a totality, is discredited by his own argument for the need of (re)integration of complexities of modern society and its necessary normative grounding. Third, the prescription of keeping the “internal logic” of steering media intact as constitutive of radical democracy is problematic both empirically and normatively. Fourth, for the functional coherence of radical democracy, “efficiency,” conceived systems-theoretically, must be abandoned and, instead, be reconceived postmetaphysically.