Impressions and affective practice: bringing unity to Bourdieu’s habitus

Abstract

Despite the key commonalities between the affective and the practical turns, affect is still an underexplored aspect in practice theory. Proposing an analytical distinction between the sociological and the ontological levels of analysis, this article looks into schemes of appraisal as they appear in Bourdieusian practice theory, and highlights how beneath the unity of social conditioning, habitus creates fragmentation between embodied and cognitive meaning. Additionally, it provides a limited and often foggy account of emotions and affectivity. To overcome these challenges, it is argued that practice theory needs to rely on a conceptualisation of subjectivity, which allows for a more holistic and affective meaning making. Doing so draws on Wetherell’s affective practice and Ahmed’s Hume-inspired concept of impression, but also on a variant of practice which works with empirical rather than epistemic individuals. A theory of practice infused with affect overcomes not only the mind-body dualism, but also contributes to reducing the tension between structural and agentic poles.