Abstract
Numerous scholars view the late 1800s as a period o f considerable party influence and little group influence. I show that in the area o f pension policies for Union veterans, entrepreneurial group politics thrived in the late 1800s and rivalled party influence. A rational choice framework is used to analyze the ability of a lobbyist entrepreneur to profit from the complex interactions between Union veterans, Congress, the Pension Bureau, and the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR). I argue that lobbyist entrepreneurs operate with recognition of the opportunities for delegation from individuals to the group and from legislators to bureaus and groups. The viability of the group's linkage function depends upon the entrepreneur's abilities to master the intricacies of delegation.
Publisher
University of Oklahoma Libraries
Cited by
9 articles.
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