1. If the central bank gave up the option to control agents' expectations -as in the case of a fixed share -, it would pre-commit akin to a "fixed rule", and this might provide credibility gains. In the opposite case in which expectations' formation is assumed an agents' choice independent of the central bank, the impact of shocks shrinks, especially if one group believes in "fundamental" steady-state inflation. This suggest that a monetary policy conduct anchoring expectations may increase the resilience of the economy to shocks;shock, because lower inflation decreases the bias and the loss, but not so for negative shocks
2. Communication and Monetary Policy;J Amato;Oxford Review of Economic Policy,2002
3. The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy;G Athey;Econometrica,2006
4. Disinflation with imperfect credibility;L Ball;Journal of Monetary Economics,1995