Why Did Sponsor Banks Rescue their SIVs? A Signaling Model of Rescues-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

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Why Did Sponsor Banks Rescue their SIVs? A Signaling Model of Rescues

Published:2014 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:1556-5068
Container-title:SSRN Electronic Journal
language:en
Short-container-title:SSRN Journal

Author:

Segura Anatoli

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Reference30 articles.

1. Securitization without Risk Transfer;Acharya;Journal of Financial Economics,2013

2. Revenge of the Steamroller: ABCP as a Window on Risk Choices;Carlos Arteta;International Finance Discussion Papers,2013

3. Equilibrium selection in signaling games;Je�rey S Banks;Econometrica,1987

4. Reputation and Discretion in Financial Contracting;Arnoud Boot;American Economic Review,1993

Cited by 3 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Leaving the darkness: The emergence of shadow banks;Journal of Financial Stability;2022-08

2. Effects from the parent’s exposure to subsidiaries inside Bank Holding Companies (BHCs);Journal of Banking Regulation;2016-10-18

3. Banks and shadow banks: Competitors or complements?;Journal of Financial Intermediation;2016-07

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