1. = m i (q); and so i (m i (^ p); m i (q)) = q: This and Lemma B.1 imply i (m(^ p)) > ^ p; and so i 2 I(^ p): But then i 2 I(q); since I(q) = I(^ p);I(q) = I(^ p): Let i 2 M (q): Then i (m(q)) = q and m i (^ p) m i (q) < t i : If i = 2 M; then m i (^ p)
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