1. difficult to imagine how an investor would be able to judge the effectiveness of different regulatory regimes, much less quantify that knowledge in a manner allowing the investor to change the purchasing or selling price of a particular security. "). In the United States, the SEC has repeatedly stated its position that protection of investors is its primary purpose;See David;Disclosure Policy with International Accounting and Disclosure Standards, 17 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 1, 9,1986
2. Black, in response, has made the argument that "bogus investment bankers" may be able to free ride on the reputation of high quality intermediaries, reducing the incentive of all intermediaries to build up a good reputation. See Black, supra note 6, at 788-89. Note that Black's argument assumes that investors are unable to distinguish;Stephen Choi;Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 916,1998
3. It is important to note, however, that the world presently has no one standard form of disclosure. Moreover, nothing presents a standard from arising even in a world of competition. In the area of state competition over corporate law, Romano has made the observation that competition in fact has led to a standard -the law of Delaware. See Romano, supra note 50, at 2394. Moreover, private intermediaries may function to provide standardization. See id. On a related note, Coffee (1999b) argues against more choice in the applicable securities regime for firms within the United States. See Coffee, supra note 261;See James;Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1200,1999