1. It may also indicate that hedge funds are learning that their campaigns are more uncertain when companies have a high concentration of passive investors. 154. In addition, the instrumental variable used in the study-the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff point-has been used in various different settings;AM. ECON. J,2013
2. For a skeptical take on settlements with activist investors, see;See Ryan Bubb & Emiliano Catan;The Agency Costs of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted Majorities, and the Public Morality,2017
3. Distracted Shareholders and Corporate Actions
4. Id. at 314. But for the reasons discussed, passive fund voting is fraught with agency problems, undermining the rationale that courts should defer to decisions blessed by their votes. 191. State law today generally provides corporations with considerable flexibility with respect to allocations of voting rights: virtually all state corporate codes adopt one vote per common share as the default rule but allow corporations to depart from the norm. See Stephen Bainbridge, The Scope of the SEC's Authority Over Shareholder Voting Rights 5 (UCLA Sch;Restricting the voting power of uninformed and unmotivated shareholders has another important benefit. Delaware courts have increasingly awarded special deference to corporate decisions that are ratified by a majority of disinterested shareholders,2007