1. Finally, the claim about A's ex ante expected utility follows from the fact that IR-ante is binding. Proof of Proposition 6, part d. Here the single ex post utility level, u * , is defined by the binding IR-ante and involves full insurance. Therefore it is independent of c and we thus have ?u * /?c = 0. The claim about P 's ex ante expected profits follows from Lemma 8b and Proposition 5. Finally, the claim about A's ex ante;Lemma 8a and Proposition 5
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