Affiliation:
1. University of California Berkeley bev@berkeley.edu
2. Vienna University of Economics and Business armon.rezai@gmail.com
Abstract
Kindleberger’s theory of hegemonic stability states that fixed
exchange rate regimes require a leader that will provide it with disproportionate
resources to ensure stability. Applying his theory to European monetary
cooperation, we argue that, like the tools of Goethe’s “Sorcerer’s Apprentice,”
European Monetary Union was constructed as a “self-regulating system,” and
it threatens to run amok without a hegemonic leader. Germany has exercised
“soft hegemony” in Europe, providing the European Union with disproportionate
resources to stabilize the single market. It has the capability to be the
Eurozone’s leader. But, by 2017, blinded by its ordoliberal ideology, i t refused
to do so, instead placing the burden of cooperation on the weak. If Germany
continues to refuse to play the role of the hegemonic leader, European Monetary
Union faces collapse.
Subject
Sociology and Political Science,History,Cultural Studies
Cited by
1 articles.
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