Affiliation:
1. Department of Information Systems Research, University of Koblenz-Landau, Koblenz, Germany
Abstract
Trust that an electronic voting system realizes the security requirements in an adequate manner is an essential premise for electronic elections. Trust in a system can be achieved by controlling the system security. There are two ways to assure system security. One way is the evaluation and certification of the implementation’s security by neutral experts. Another way is the verification of the outcome by the users. Both approaches, verification and certification, should be combined to reasonably justify the voter’s trust in the electronic voting system. In this paper a formal security model with respect to the requirements of Fairness, Eligibility, Secrecy and Receipt-Freeness, Verifiability and Protection against Precipitation is given. This formal model helps to clarify and truly understand these requirements. Furthermore, it can be used for the evaluation and certification of online voting products according to the Common Criteria.
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