Optimizing Operational and Sustainable Decisions for GASC

Abstract

This study delves into the operational decision-making and sustainability dynamics within a two-tier green agricultural supply chain (GASC), comprising a manufacturer and a retailer. By developing decision models for the manufacturer, both with and without outward altruism, we explore the intricate interplay of government subsidies, consumer green preferences, and manufacturers' altruistic behavior influencing operational efficiency and sustainability within the GASC based on the Stackelberg Game. Our findings underscore the intricate relationship between these factors and the retail pricing of green agricultural products. Specifically, we demonstrate that while the manufacturer's outward altruism is significant, the combined effects of government subsidies and consumer preferences exert substantial influence on pricing strategies. Moreover, we reveal that government subsidies, consumer preferences for sustainability, and manufacturers' altruistic actions collectively bolster the economic, environmental, and social dimensions of sustainability within the GASC.