Affiliation:
1. University of Bucharest, Romania
Abstract
The authors analyze three social choice rules (plurality voting, approval voting and Borda count) from a behavioral economics perspective aiming three objectives: 1) if it is a viable solution to use these procedures during mass elections; 2) why individuals prefer a specific social choice rule and not another; 3) how status quo bias and framing effect influence the preference of individuals for a certain social choice rule. The research is conducted with 87 participants to a lab experiment and data suggest that for using approval voting and Borda count during mass elections is necessary to increase the people level of information about their benefits. When making a decision in a political or economic context seem that people tend to prefer simple plurality rule do to its availability and maybe because of its strong reliance with status quo bias.
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