Using a Public Key Registry for Improved Trust and Scalability in National E-Health Systems
Author:
Liu Vicky1, Caelli William1, Chen Yu-Nien Maggie2
Affiliation:
1. Science and Engineering Faculty, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia 2. Graduate School of Asia and Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
Abstract
An increasing number of countries are faced with an aging population increasingly needing healthcare services. For any e-health information system, the need for increased trust by such clients with potentially little knowledge of any security scheme involved is paramount. In addition notable scalability of any system has become a critical aspect of system design, development and ongoing management. Meanwhile cryptographic systems provide the security provisions needed for confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. Cryptographic key management, however, must be secure, yet efficient and effective in developing an attitude of trust in system users. Digital certificate-based Public Key Infrastructure has long been the technology of choice or availability for information security/assurance; however, there appears to be a notable lack of successful implementations and deployments globally. Moreover, recent issues with associated Certificate Authority security have damaged trust in these schemes. This paper proposes the adoption of a centralised public key registry structure, a non-certificate based scheme, for large scale e-health information systems. The proposed structure removes complex certificate management, revocation and a complex certificate validation structure while maintaining overall system security. Moreover, the registry concept may be easier for both healthcare professionals and patients to understand and trust.
Subject
Health Informatics,Computer Science Applications
Reference34 articles.
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