Transitivity and Humeanism about Laws

Abstract

Humeanism about laws has been famously accused of the explanatory circularity by David Armstrong and Tim Maudlin, since the Humean laws hold in virtue of their instances and, at the same time, scientifically explain those very instances. Barry Loewer argued that the circularity challenge rests on an equivocation: in his view, once the metaphysical explanation is properly distinguished from the scientific explanation, the circularity vanishes. However, Marc Lange restored the circularity by appealing to his transitivity principle, which connects the two types of explanation. Lange’s transitivity principle has been widely discussed and criticised in the literature. In view of counterexamples, Lange refi ned both the principle, by taking into account the contrastive nature of explanation, and the requirement of prohibition on self-explanation. Recently, Michael Hicks has developed a new strategy for defending Humeanism about laws from the refined circularity challenge, critically appealing to the contrastive nature of both explanations and meta-explanations. We will argue that his strategy fails.