Abstract
The current century has witnessed several high-profile Western military interventions in developing countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Mali/West Africa are well-known examples. All three were initiated unilaterally by the US or France but were soon supplemented with multilateral missions which operated in parallel with the unilateral intervention force, giving them a “messy” appearance. In the three cases, the foreign policy decision-makers in the US and France reacted mainly to domestic stimuli, most evidently in the case of the US, where revenge for 9/11 was a strong motive. Like-minded partners in NATO and troops from developing countries shared the burdens of the US and France and gave legitimacy to the military interventions. The consequences of the interventions were not that they contributed to stability. Rather they supported the incumbent elites, as they were able to avoid launching economic and political reform. The lack of reform undermined the prospects for stability.
Subject
Public Administration,Sociology and Political Science
Reference66 articles.
1. Acharya, A. (2014). Post-hegemonic multilateralism. In T. G. Weiss & R. Wilkinson (Eds.), International organization and global governance (pp. 192–204). Routledge.
2. Alden, C., & Aran, A. (2017). Foreign policy analysis. New approaches. Routledge.
3. Bach, D. (2011). Patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism: Comparative trajectories and readings. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 49(3), 275–294.
4. Berdal, M., & Zaum, D. (Eds.). (2013). Political economy of statebuilding. Power after peace. Routledge.
5. Bizhan, D. (2018). Aid and state-building, part II: Afghanistan and Iraq. Third World Quarterly, 39(5), 1014–1031.
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献