Abstract
This article shows that the EU has exerted uneven influence within the global regime complex in shadow banking. Why? We seek to explain the variation in the EU’s ability to exert influence across different elemental regimes—those on hedge funds and securitization—in the broader regime complex over time. In hedge funds regulation, the EU has pursued more stringent international rules, to no avail. In securitization, the EU has been more successful in promoting more lenient regulation at the international level. We focus on the EU’s internal cohesiveness (which can change over time) as the key explanatory variable.
Subject
Public Administration,Sociology and Political Science
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