Abstract
What is knowledge of persons, and what is knowing persons like? my answer combines (a bit of) Wittgenstein’s epistemology with (a bit of) levinas’s phenomenology. It says that our knowledge of persons is a hinge proposition for us (as in: ‘I am not of the opinion that he has a soul’, PI ii, iv). And it says that what this knowledge consists in is the experience that levinas calls ‘the face to face’: direct and unmediated encounter between persons. As levinas says, for there to be persons at all there has, first, to be a relationship, language, and this same encounter: ‘the face to face’ comes first, the existence of individual persons only second. I explore some consequences of this conception for how we think about personhood, and also for how we read Descartes and Augustine.
Publisher
Verein zur Forderung der Fachzeitschrift European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Subject
Philosophy,Religious studies
Cited by
24 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. Communication, Agency, and the Relational Self in ASD and the Letters of Paul;Journal of Disability & Religion;2021-04-19
2. Index;Neurology and Religion;2019-11-07
3. Bibliography;Neurology and Religion;2019-11-07
4. Near-Death and Out-of-Body Experiences;Neurology and Religion;2019-11-07
5. Examining the Continuum of Life to Determine Death;Neurology and Religion;2019-11-07