1. 1 The district court exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. s 3231, which provides that the district courts have original jurisdiction "of all offenses against the laws of the United States." We exercise appellate jurisdiction over the district court's final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 1291, and have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. s 3742(b)(3) to review a final sentence where, as here, the sentence is less than the minimum sentence specified in the applicable Guidelines range.
2. 2 The genesis of section 5H1.6 lies in Congress' directive to the Sentencing Commission to "assure that the guidelines and policy statements . reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the . family ties and responsibilities . of the defendant." 28 U.S.C. s 994(e).
3. 3 We point out that the government does not challenge the accuracy of the evidence in the record concerning the nature of Sweeting's family ties and responsibilities - for example - the type of specialized care her son requires because of his condition. Rather, it asserts that the facts in the record do not warrant a downward departure because they do not demonstrate that her family situation is extraordinary in the sense contemplated by section 5H1.6. Similarly, for purposes of our analysis, we assume the accuracy of the historical facts in the record, but part company with the district court's ultimate factual conclusion that those circumstances render Sweeting's family ties and responsibilities so "extraordinary" so as to take this case out of the heartland of cases sentenced under the Guidelines. Moreover, it is appropriate to mention at this juncture that although our analysis of the nature of Sweeting's family responsibilities proceeds by examining each component of the district court's analysis separately, we have considered the cumulative effect of the totality of the circumstances presented in this case. And, as we have indicated in the text, we simply see no sound basis for upholding the district court's departure determination notwithstanding our deferential standard of review.
4. 4 Sweeting apparently recognizes that her son's condition is pivotal to the analysis of whether the district court erred in granting a departure under section 5H1.6 given her family situation. Importantly, this factor is the sole basis on which she argues in her brief that she faces "extraordinary" family responsibilities. See br. at 12 ("It is submitted that this mother's responsibilities for the care of an adolescent child with Tourette's Syndrome constituted an extraordinary family responsibility. For this reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion [in] granting the downward departure." ).
5. 5 We recognize, as Sweeting points out in her brief, that there are decisions by other courts of appeals that have upheld downward departures under section 5H1.6 where the circumstances demonstrated that the defendant was responsible for the care of a sick family member. She contends that those cases support her position because the defendants were responsible for the care of dependents, at least one of whom was disabled. We reject this argument, however, as we do not agree with Sweeting's assessment that the cases she cites are analogous to the factual situation presented here. Indeed, a review of the cases that she relies upon confirms that each had an additional factual component distinguishing it from this case. See, e.g.