1. 1 Some confidence that interests and intentions between the "engager" and target state are somehow mutually compatible, i.e., not a game of deadlock but a coordination game where engagement plays important enabling functions, like transparency and communication.
2. Victor D. Cha is Associate Professor of Government in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. An earlier and different version of this article was presented at the Conference on North Korea's Engagement-Perspectives, Outlooks, and Implications, co-sponsored by the National Intelligence Council and the Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Washington, D.C., February2001. The author is grateful to Mitchell Reiss and Chip Usher for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.
3. Asian Survey, 41:4, pp. 549-563. ISSN: 0004-4687 c2001by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223.
4. 1 For recent conceptual and applied studies of engagement strategies, see Randall Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, eds., Engaging China (New York: Routledge, 1999); Victor Cha, "Democracy and Unification: The Dilemma of Engagement," in The Two Koreas and the U.S., Wonmo Dong, ed. (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2000); Richard Haas and Meghan O'Sullivan, "Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies," Survival 42:2 (Summer 2000); and George Shambaugh, States, Firms, and Power: Successful Sanctions in U.S. Foreign Policy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), chs. 1 and 6.
5. 2 Portions of the empirical overview are excerpted from "Japan-Korea Relations," CSIS Comparative Connections, January-March 2001, at . For a useful new study on Japan-DPRK relations, see B. C. Koh, From Discord to Collaboration (book manuscript, September 2000).