Abstract
Abstract
In efforts to resolve social dilemmas, reinforcement learning is an alternative to imitation and exploration in evolutionary game theory. While imitation and exploration rely on the performance of neighbors, in reinforcement learning individuals alter their strategies based on their own performance in the past. For example, according to the Bush–Mosteller model of reinforcement learning, an individual’s strategy choice is driven by whether the received payoff satisfies a preset aspiration or not. Stimuli also play a key role in reinforcement learning in that they can determine whether a strategy should be kept or not. Here we use the Monte Carlo method to study pattern formation and phase transitions towards cooperation in social dilemmas that are driven by reinforcement learning. We distinguish local and global players according to the source of the stimulus they experience. While global players receive their stimuli from the whole neighborhood, local players focus solely on individual performance. We show that global players play a decisive role in ensuring cooperation, while local players fail in this regard, although both types of players show properties of ‘moody cooperators’. In particular, global players evoke stronger conditional cooperation in their neighborhoods based on direct reciprocity, which is rooted in the emerging spatial patterns and stronger interfaces around cooperative clusters.
Funder
Fok Ying-Tong Education Foundation, China
National Key R&D Program of China
The Slovenian Research Agency
Key Technology Research and Development Program of Science and Technology-Scientific and Technological Innovation Team of Shaanxi Province
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Key Area R&D Program of Guangdong Province
National Natural Science Foundation for Distinguished Young Scholars
Subject
General Physics and Astronomy
Reference61 articles.
1. The evolution of cooperation and altruism—a general framework and a classification of models;Lehmann;J. Evol. Biol.,2006
2. Social semantics: altruism, cooperation, mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selection;West;J. Evol. Biol.,2007
3. Transition from reciprocal cooperation to persistent behaviour in social dilemmas at the end of adolescence;Xia;Chaos,2020
4. Effect of memory, intolerance, and second-order reputation on cooperation;Gutiérrez-Roig;Nat. Commun.,2014
5. Evolutionary games and spatial chaos;Nowak;Nature,1992
Cited by
45 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献