Evolution of cooperation with individual diversity on interdependent weighted networks

Abstract

Abstract The social networks as a complex set of networks fully reflect internal relations of individual interactions between them. Individual as an integral part of networks can show different functions under different levels. In the vast majority of current research realm of spatial evolutionary game, individuals who are often treated as identical peers interact with the local neighbours on a single, isolated same network, even the independent networks extended the content of spatial reciprocity. However, the individual diversity, including gender, wealth and social status and so on, usually is presented within the population. Individual heterogeneity impacts on the evolution of cooperation amongst selfish individuals. With this motivation, here we consider that two forms including Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and Snowdrift Game (SG) take place on interdependent weighted networks via the mixed-coupling in which individuals participate in different networks of interactions, cooperative behaviour can be maintained. Remarkably, the numerical analysis shows that, as the network interdependence considering individual diversity increases, cooperation thrives on one network joining in PD, the other engaging in SG may be plagued by defectors. Meanwhile, there exists an optimal region of mixed-coupling between networks to persist in cooperation of one network. Furthermore, individual diversity may be a link between non-trivial systems across the network connection, thus probing in how to schedule heterogeneous competitive tasks and services in complex manufacturing systems.