Market-oriented solutions for groundwater commons through collective-action

Abstract

Abstract Groundwater scarcity poses threats to communities across the globe, and effectively managing those challenges requires designing policy that achieves institutional fit. Collective action is well-suited to match rules with local context, and multiple pathways exist for communities to achieve reductions in groundwater use. To better understand how local conditions influence rule design, we examine two groundwater-reliant communities in the Western US that engaged in collective-action to arrive at distinct groundwater management rules. We consider: what drove stakeholders in Northwestern Kansas (NWKS) and San Luis Valley, Colorado (SLV) to adopt local groundwater policies, and why were different management pathways chosen? Further, why is more heterogeneity observed between local management organizations in SLV as compared to NWKS? To investigate these questions, we employ grounded theory to interpret the rules in reference to local hydro-agro-economic statistics and interviews with stakeholders (n = 19) in each region selected by expert sampling. We find that the additional goals of groundwater rules in SLV, partially driven by key contrasts in the resource system compared to NWKS, and higher resource productivity in SLV, creates both the need for and efficacy of a price-centered policy. Furthermore, variation in the resource systems and associated farm characteristics between subdistricts drives higher heterogeneity in rule design between local management districts in SLV compared to NWKS. More generally, we find the local flexibility afforded through the collective-action process as critical, even if it were to arrive at alternative, non-economic based incentives.