Effect of conformity on evolution of cooperation in a coordination game

Abstract

Individual decision-making processes are not solely driven by self-interest maximization but are also influenced by the pressure to conform to the group. In primary games like the prisoner’s dilemma, the presence of conformity pressure may facilitate the constructive development of cooperative behavior. In this study, we investigate how conformity influences the growth of cooperation in complicated coordination games. Our findings reveal that, even in the presence of stringent game rules, conformity can promote cooperation. In fact, a certain level of conformity pressure can even eliminate the “defection basin” of deer hunting games played on regular networks. Additionally, we demonstrate that the effect of conformity on cooperative behavior is contingent upon the degree of conformity pressure, with different levels of conformity pressure producing opposite effects. These findings provide novel insights into the promotion of cooperative evolution. For instance, if increasing the reward for cooperation has proven ineffective, manipulating the proportion of initial strategy choices may be a more promising approach.