Abstract
Abstract
In order to alleviate environmental problems such as air pollution, this paper starts from the new energy automobile industry and analyzes the behavior strategies between the government and consumers, two stakeholders of new energy automobiles, through the dynamic game model. The following conclusions can be drawn from the utility function. First, theoretically, the government will not provide any financial subsidies for new-energy vehicles. Second, consumers’ behavioral strategies are influenced by financial subsidies, vehicle purchase taxes, and the utility and cost of purchasing new energy vehicles or traditional vehicles. Therefore, the government should pay attention to the social level in order to achieve the maximum of social utility. On the one hand, the government should enhance the continuity of subsidy policies for consumers who buy new energy vehicles and strengthen the supervision of the implementation of subsidy policies. On the other hand, the government should play a positive role of its own credibility to the public and improve the awareness of environmental protection among car buyers. And consumers should constantly improve the sense of responsibility for environmental protection, so that the two can cooperate with each other and make contributions to environmental protection.
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